Trusted Flaggers and the Digital Services Act: Extraterritorial Implications for Georgia as an EU Candidate Country
Dr. Nina Shengelia
Dr. Nina Shengelia is a UK-qualified lawyer based in Tbilisi whose research spans critical areas including digital constitutionalism, regulation, digital rights, human rights, social media councils, the Digital Services Act (DSA), hate speech, disinformation, FIMI and media literacy. Nina is also the founder of the Social Media Council Georgia (SMCG), a platform that addresses FIMI risks and promotes media literacy, bringing together respected legal scholars to influence policy conversations and advance solutions in the digital age.
The Digital Services Act (DSA) of the European Union is an innovative legislative framework designed to ensure safer and more accountable online digital spaces like social media platforms. It aims to make digital platforms safer and responsible for all of its users. This legislation was passed to govern digital platforms, online intermediaries and service providers and it lays out a thorough set of requirements.
The DSA’s main provisions are aimed at protecting fundamental human rights, including privacy and freedom of speech, while preventing harmful online actions, disinformation and illegal content. Platforms are required by law to put in place strong procedures for risk assessments, transparency reporting, and content moderation. Large online platforms that fall under the category of Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) are subject to additional duties, such as allowing independent auditors to examine their operations and reducing systemic risks.
The inclusion of the term “trusted flaggers” which are organisations given rights to report illegal or harmful content, is another crucial component of the DSA. In the context of DSA, when using the term “extraterritorial effects” it refers to a law or regulation that has effect beyond the borders of the country or entity that created it. In the case of the DSA, these effects emerge because the legislation extends not only to entities within the EU but also to those outside the EU that provide services to EU users or actively target the EU market. The DSA impacts platforms and service providers outside the EU that target European customers or conduct business in the EU market in addition to enterprises based in the EU.
Because of this, the DSA plays a crucial role in forming regulations that extend well beyond the boundaries of the EU. One should not forget that the DSA’s primary jurisdiction is limited to the EU, however, its extraterritorial provisions have significant implications for countries pursuing EU membership, such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
The DSA’s impact is particularly relevant to these nations, with Ukraine and Moldova actively aligning with EU standards as EU candidate countries. However, despite having EU candidacy status, Georgia’s trajectory has shifted following alleged widespread election irregularities and the election of a pro-Russian government.
This blog post investigates the extraterritorial implications of the DSA for Georgia, focusing on the ‘Trusted Flagger’ mechanism under the DSA.
Empowering Content Moderation: The Role and Impact of Trusted Flaggers under the DSA
DSA’s Article 22 presents the idea of “trusted flaggers,” a system intended to improve the effectiveness, precision, and dependability of content moderation on digital platforms. Organisations with specific knowledge in spotting and reporting illegal content are known as trusted flaggers, and they are frequently civil society organisations (CSOs). They play a crucial part in maintaining the security of online environments while defending essential human rights like the right to free speech.
In the EU, the DSA recognizes the critical role of “trusted flaggers” in maintaining safer online spaces by efficiently identifying and reporting illegal content. These entities are formally designated by national Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs) based on their expertise and impartiality. Their efforts ensure faster content removal and enhance platform accountability.
For example, in Finland, the Copyright Information and Anti-Piracy Center (Tekijänoikeuden tiedotus- ja valvontakeskus ry) has been designated as a trusted flagger. With over four decades of experience in protecting intellectual property rights, this organization specializes in detecting and reporting copyright infringements. Similarly, Austria’s Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb, an association focused on combating unfair competition, leverages its expertise to monitor and report violations of industrial property rights.
In Sweden, ECPAT Sweden serves as a trusted flagger, dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children. Designated by Sweden’s Post and Telecom Authority, ECPAT plays a vital role in identifying and reporting online content related to child exploitation.
These examples demonstrate the diverse focus areas of trusted flaggers across the EU, from intellectual property protection to child safety, showcasing the DSA’s adaptability in leveraging specialized expertise to tackle illegal content effectively.
The trusted flagger system established under the DSA is particularly relevant for Georgia, where recent political developments have exacerbated vulnerabilities in the online space. Following allegations of rigged elections and widespread protests against the government’s authoritarian tendencies, including the controversial introduction of the foreign agency law, Georgia’s political course has taken a concerning turn. The government’s perceived alignment with pro-Russian policies and its failure to uphold democratic principles have intensified public mistrust and created ground for disinformation to flourish.
In this context, the absence of platform liability in Georgia is at the core of the problem, as digital platforms operate with minimal accountability for the spread of harmful narratives, polarizing rhetoric, and foreign information manipulation. The trusted flagger system could offer a critical mechanism to address these challenges. Empowering independent fact-checking organizations and CSOs to play a formal role in identifying and reporting harmful content, could reduce pitfalls in content moderation.
Furthermore, the adoption of a trusted flagger mechanism could signal Georgia’s commitment to aligning with European values and standards, a key step given the Georgian people’s aspirations for EU membership. It would also bolster public trust by promoting transparency and accountability in the digital domain, countering the government’s pro-Russian course, and ensuring greater democratic resilience amidst political instability.
However, organisations must fulfil certain requirements in order to be certified as trusted flaggers. For their evaluations to be objective, they must exhibit a high level of independence from corporate or political forces. They must also demonstrate vigilance in their procedures, which includes continuing to report material in a way that is accurate and trustworthy. Another essential prerequisite is effective content moderation, which guarantees that the content that is flagged complies with the legal definitions of illegality.
Platforms provide trusted flaggers with priority processing of their reports when they are certified. This enables the removal of unlawful content more quickly since their flags are examined more thoroughly and quickly than user complaints in general. The goal of this prioritisation is to maximize the platforms’ moderating efforts while also reducing the possible harm that such content may cause. Crucially, the trusted flagger system is made to strike a compromise between the protection of users’ rights and the requirement for efficient content removal. The framework includes safeguards to defend against abuse or overreach of authority, making sure that the procedure doesn’t unnecessarily restrict the right to free speech.
Prospects for Trusted Flaggers in Georgia
In addition to the above discussion, unless a CSO is present in the EU and satisfies all other requirements listed in the DSA, non-EU organizations are expressly prohibited from becoming trusted flaggers under Article 22 of the DSA. This provision does not, however, bar non-EU citizens from taking part. If working under a local contract, professionals from outside the EU can assist in running EU-established trusted flaggers.
The inclusion of trusted flaggers in the DSA was motivated by the fact that many platforms already work with organisations that are not officially certified as trusted flaggers. In Georgia, this kind of voluntary collaboration might be explored further, enabling platforms to deal with content moderation issues locally.
Voluntary collaboration presents both opportunities and challenges, particularly in Georgia’s current political and digital landscape. On the positive side, such collaboration offers flexibility, allowing platforms and local organizations to address specific issues like disinformation or hate speech that are deeply rooted in Georgia’s sociopolitical context. Local expertise plays a critical role here, as Georgian organizations have the cultural and linguistic understanding needed to handle nuanced cases that global platforms might overlook or misinterpret. Moreover, this approach can be implemented quickly, bypassing the delays associated with formal recognition processes, and could serve as a capacity-building opportunity for local CSOs, preparing them for potential certification in the future.
However, there are significant downsides to relying on voluntary collaboration. Without formal accountability mechanisms, platforms may deprioritize input from local CSOs, reducing the overall impact of their efforts. The absence of standardized certification also raises concerns about the consistency and credibility of the organizations involved. Additionally, local organizations often operate with limited resources, which could hinder their ability to engage effectively over the long term.
In Georgia’s polarized environment, where disinformation and politically motivated narratives are prevalent, there’s also a risk of such collaborations being manipulated by the interests of political parties. This could further erode public confidence in the moderation process. Lastly, voluntary arrangements depend entirely on platforms’ willingness to cooperate, and in politically sensitive contexts like Georgia, platforms might hesitate to engage fully due to perceived risks.
While voluntary collaboration could be a practical interim measure, its limitations outlined above suggest a need for a more formalized system similar to the trusted flagger framework under the DSA that would provide stronger safeguards and a more consistent approach to content moderation in the long run.
Meta has a partnership with two Georgian fact-checking groups, FactCheck Georgia (run by GRASS) and Myth Detector (run by the Media Development Foundation). Both groups, who hold International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) certification, seek to debunk disinformation in Georgian social media. Since they started working with Meta in September 2020, these partnerships have used local knowledge to find and eliminate false content, making the internet a safer place for Georgian users.
But this is only the beginning. More is required in order to develop a more complete and resilient approach to digital governance in Georgia. An ecosystem-wide solution is needed to address the larger problems of hate speech, disinformation, and online safety. Current fact-checking initiatives often address only surface-level misinformation, leaving the broader and more complex problem of disinformation campaigns unaddressed. Disinformation campaigns are frequently centrally planned, involving coordinated and sophisticated strategies that surpass the capabilities of fact-checking alone. For instance, the use of AI-driven bots to amplify false narratives, deepfake technologies to fabricate convincing but false audiovisual content, and cross-platform coordination to spread propaganda highlights the need for a more robust approach. These activities require deeper monitoring, analysis, and intervention. These are capabilities that lie outside the traditional scope of fact-checkers.
Additionally, addressing the systemic roots of disinformation calls for stronger platform governance and regulatory enforcement. Platforms operating in Georgia must be held accountable for the algorithms that prioritize divisive or false content, incentivized by their engagement-driven business models. Fact-checking cannot address this structural issue, as it deals with the consequences rather than the causes of disinformation.
Moreover, building resilience against disinformation requires cultivating a digitally literate society that can critically assess online content and identify manipulation tactics. This is where frameworks like the Young People and Information Manifesto by the Centre for Connected Learning (3CL) become instrumental. The manifesto highlights the importance of integrating collaborative efforts, fostering ethical platform governance, and empowering individuals to navigate the digital landscape responsibly.
At this point, the concept of a Georgia Social Media Council becomes crucial.
The Georgia Social Media Council
To solve content governance challenges, the Social Media Council would act as a multi-stakeholder platform that unites academics, industry professionals, digital platforms, and CSOs. By addressing existing weaknesses in content governance, such an approach would establish a long-term foundation for digital resilience. To guarantee that Georgia’s digital ecosystem develops in a way that fosters safety, trust, and transparency for all users, platforms like Meta and other stakeholders should fund and encourage the creation of this council.
On the positive side, such funding would enable the Council to operate with the necessary resources to address complex challenges like disinformation, hate speech, and online safety, fostering a safer and more transparent digital ecosystem in Georgia. It would also signal a commitment from platforms to support local governance mechanisms and align with European regulatory standards. However, there are potential drawbacks, including the risk of the Council being perceived as overly influenced by its funders, which could undermine its independence and credibility. Balancing stakeholder interests and maintaining impartiality would be critical to avoid conflicts of interest.
The Georgia Social Media Council is designed to operate as a fully independent body, free from any governmental influence. This independence is essential to its mission of fostering accountability, transparency, and ethical governance of the digital space. While the name might suggest a formal link to the state, it is crucial to clarify that the Council is entirely autonomous, ensuring that its work is not subject to the priorities or agendas of the current Georgian government, which has faced criticism for its reluctance to tackle disinformation and its alignment with pro-Russian narratives.
As an independent organization, the Council will bring together diverse stakeholders, including civil society leaders, media professionals, academics, and international experts, to ensure a broad and impartial approach to digital governance.
By maintaining its independence, the Georgia Social Media Council can build public trust and credibility, positioning itself as a vital player in strengthening the country’s digital resilience and aligning with European standards for platform governance and democratic values.
A multistakeholder approach, as seen in the DSA, provides a more effective framework for addressing digital governance challenges compared to a fragmented system of individual CSOs working independently. By uniting a range of stakeholders—CSOs, academia, industry representatives, and policymakers—this approach fosters coordinated action and creates a unified mechanism to tackle complex issues like disinformation, hate speech, and platform accountability.
One of the key advantages of this approach is the ability to align efforts and reduce inefficiencies. When CSOs operate in isolation, there is often duplication of work, conflicting priorities, or gaps in addressing certain problems. A centralized multistakeholder model ensures that resources, expertise, and efforts are pooled together, enabling a more strategic and comprehensive response. This coordination also allows for the inclusion of diverse perspectives: CSOs provide grassroots insights, academia offers research-driven analysis, and industry representatives contribute practical solutions. This diversity results in a well-rounded approach that no single CSO could achieve on its own.
Centralization also builds credibility and trust. Platforms and governments are more likely to engage with a unified body that represents a balanced and collective voice. A single point of contact with standardized practices not only simplifies collaboration but also ensures consistent and transparent outcomes. This is particularly beneficial for platforms, which would otherwise need to collaborate with multiple CSOs, each potentially operating under different methodologies and agendas.
However, centralization comes with trade-offs. Balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders can be challenging, and there is a risk of bureaucratic inefficiencies. Additionally, ensuring equitable representation within the multistakeholder body is critical to avoid dominance by any one group. Despite these challenges, the benefits of a coordinated, adaptable, and scalable model far outweigh the drawbacks, making the multistakeholder approach a powerful tool for tackling the increasingly complex problems of digital governance.
In contexts like Georgia, adopting such a model could provide a much-needed solution to fragmented efforts in addressing disinformation and fostering platform accountability, setting a standard that aligns with European practices and values.
Conclusion
The DSA’s extraterritorial consequences offer both possibilities and responsibilities to nations like Georgia who have EU ambitions but are dealing with political and governance issues. Although it was mainly created for the EU, the trusted flagger system emphasises the need for strong local knowledge and cooperation in preventing online damage and building confidence in digital platforms. There is still a significant gap in creating a thorough and long-lasting content governance structure, even though Georgia’s CSOs have previously partnered with platforms like Meta. Georgia has to proactively align with international best practices to successfully traverse this complicated digital world. A crucial first step in promoting multi-stakeholder cooperation and tackling the more general issues of hate speech, disinformation, and online safety would be further developing a state-independent body like the Social Media Council Georgia.
Georgia can create a robust digital ecosystem that not only conforms with EU requirements but also upholds democratic principles and European ambitions by adopting these steps and utilising the experience of regional CSOs. By doing this, Georgia will show that it is prepared to take on the difficulties of digital governance and open the door to further integration into the digital world of Europe.
NB: This blog was written prior to Mark Zuckerberg’s recent decision to abolish fact-checking networks on Facebook in the USA, a move that significantly impacts the platform’s approach to content moderation. The decision introduces a complex, transitional period that raises critical questions about platform liability and the responsibilities of social media companies in combating misinformation. As platforms grapple with the balance between free speech and accountability, this development underscores the need for urgent dialogue on regulatory frameworks and their implications for digital governance.


